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On the basis of scholarly literature, archival materials and available newspapers
from the period, the author reconstructs the political activities of Dr. Ivo Pilar
during the final years of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’s existence. Pilar
thought the “South Slav Question” should be solved in “Croatian terms,” that is
to say the unification of all Croatian lands — Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and
Bosnia and Hercegovina — in one independent administrative area contained
within the existing dualistic system. Even though he formally remained within
the framework of dualism, he was, in fact, advocating a solution which in its
main outlines was a form of “veiled trialism.” The Hungarian politicians’ rejec-
tion of a solution of the “South Slav Question” in “Croatian terms,” that is, their
attempt to attach Bosnia and Hercegovina to the Hungarian part of the
Monarchy as a “corpus separatum”, caused additional dissatisfaction and deep-
ened the already serious crisis into which the Monarchy had fallen. Recognizing
that one of the consequences of the World War was going to be the irreversible
disappearance of the time-honoured Habsburg state from the Central European
political stage, Pilar radicalized his position in terms of its internal reform,
proposing that it be transformed — into a federation.
“Die habsburgische Monarchie steht im Süden vor schicksalsschweren
Entscheidungen. Wer klar sieht, muss mit sich im Reinen sein, dass die
Monarchie die strikte Wahl hat: entweder sofort ein Königreich Kroatien mit
ihr oder nach einigen Dezenien ein Königreich Grossserbien gegen sie”.
Ivo PILAR, “Das südslavische Problem im Habsburgerreiche”,
Kroatische Rundschau, Zagreb, 1/1918, no. 9, S. 124.
A fter the arrangement of the Austro-Hungarian Agreement of 1867, the HabsburgMonarchy was divided into an Austrian (Cisleithanian) part and a Hungarian
(Transleithanian) part.1 According to the terms of the new constitutional framework,
Dalmatia and the Croatian part of Istria, along with the Slovenian lands, entered the
Austrian part of the Monarchy, while Banian Croatia, together with Vojvodina, the
1 A. J. P. TAYLOR, Habsburπka Monarhija 1809-1918, Zagreb, 1990, pp. 161-173.
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Hungarian part. A year later, the Croato-Hungarian Agreement was concluded,
which was a sub-dualistic amendment of the established dualistic organization of the
state. Under the terms of the Agreement, Croatia and Hungary defined their consti-
tutional relationship to each other. The dynastic union of Croatia and Hungary dat-
ing back to 1102 and the real union of 1790 had been shattered by the revolution-
ary upheaval of 1848, so the constitutional relationship between the two kingdoms
was unclear until 1868. With its 70 articles, the Agreement established the funda-
mental legal relationship between Croatia and Hungary that would obtain until 1918.
Above all, the Agreement affirmed the indivisibility of the lands of the Crown of St.
Stephen. Further, joint representation, joint business and a joint government for all
matters except interior affairs were stipulated, besides which the Provincial
Administration for Croatia and Slavonia (Civil Croatia) was ascribed autonomy in the
sphere of administration of justice, religious affairs, and education. Under the pro-
visions of the Agreement, Civil Croatia was subordinated to Hungary in two impor-
tant ways: 1) the Croatian ban (viceroy) was appointed by the king on the recom-
mendation of the Hungarian prime minister, and the minister for Croatia and
Slavonia was not responsible to the Croatian Sabor (Assembly), but to the joint par-
liament in Budapest; and 2) in financial matters Civil Croatia was totally dependent
on Hungary, because its budget was approved by the Hungarian minister of finance.
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The question of the status of the port city of Rijeka was solved by means of the “Ri-
jeka scrap” to the advantage of Hungary, which the Croatian Sabor never accepted.2
The Croato-Hungarian Agreement erected a relatively long-lived constitutional sys-
tem for Civil Croatia and established a stable and comparatively broad institutional
framework for Croatian autonomy. Despite the many limitations that arose from the
Agreement, it nevertheless enabled, by means of an autonomous legislature, a mod-
ernization of the by then largely antiquated Croatian institutions of government to
take place.3
On the basis of the decisions taken at the Berlin Congress (1878), the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy obtained the right to “occupy” Bosnia and Hercegovina, which
were under the suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan. The annexation of Bosnia and Her-
cegovina was carried out by Imperial decree on 5 October 1908. The newly acquired
territory, which was given the status of a co-dominion, was administered by the joint
Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Finance (1912-1918).
Pilar and Stadler’s “Memorandum” to Pope Benedict XV
(January 1915)
The ominous shots fired in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, from the gun of the youthful
Serbian assassin Gavrilo Princip marked a new chapter in the history of humanity.4
They were, indeed, the spark that set off the First World War (1914-1918). In this
war, the largest in the history of humankind up to that time, four empires disap-
peared: the German, the Russian, the Austrian, and the Turkish.
After the start of the war, the Kingdom of Italy, the unreliable member of the
Central Powers,5 remained temporarily neutral. The Archbishop of Vrhbosna (Sara-
jevo), Dr. Joseph Stadler, known as an individual favourable to the Frank’s (Pure)
Party of (Croat State) Right orientation in terms of a solution to the situation of the
Croatian lands within the borders of the Monarchy,6 had trustworthy information
about the attempt of the Entente powers, that is Great Britain, France, and Russia,
to win Italy over to enter the war on their side. Worried that the realization of this
plan might change the balance of power between the two warring camps and lead
to the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on January 28, 1915 he
sent Pope Benedict XV a “Memorandum” requesting him to use his influence toward
preserving Italy’s neutrality in the world conflict. In the “Memorandum”, Archbishop
Stadler stated that by directly appealing to the head of the Catholic Church he was
2 N. RATNER, Postanak Hrvatsko-ugarske nagodbe od godine 1868., Zagreb — Beograd, 1949; Jaroslav
©IDAK, Mirjana GROSS, Igor KARAMAN and Dragutin ©EPI∆, Povijest hrvatskog naroda g. 1860-1914., Za-
greb, 1968, pp. 38-43; Vasilije KRESTI∆, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba, Beograd, 1969; Josip ©ARINI∆, Na-
godbena Hrvatska. Postanak i osnove ustavne organizacije, Zagreb, 1972.
3 Dalibor »EPULO, “Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba i reforme institucija vlasti u Hrvatskom saboru 1868.-
1871.”, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta SveuËiliπta u Rijeci, Rijeka, 2001, Suppl., no. 1, pp. 117-148.
4 R. W. SETON-WATSON, Sarajevo. Studija o uzrocima svetskog rata, Zagreb, 1926; L.[eo] PFEFFER, Istra-
ga u Sarajevskom atentatu, Zagreb, 1938.
5 Vladimir ©ULEK, Diplomatska historija Centralnih sila, 1882-1915, I-II, Zagreb, 1938-1939.
6 Stjepan MATKOVI∆, »ista stranka prava 1895.-1903., Zagreb, 2001; Zoran GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost
vrhobosanskog nadbiskupa Josipa Stadlera, Zagreb, 2001.
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not really going beyond his spiritual duties and entering into the political sphere,
because, in his opinion, the preservation of the Monarchy as a state was very close-
ly tied to the continued existence of Catholicism on its south eastern frontiers. Even
if Archbishop Stadler composed and signed the “Memorandum”, its content was
inspired by Dr. Ivo Pilar, Stadler’s onetime bitter political opponent.7 In his private
letter to Dr. Pilar, Stadler said: “You would be pleased with me, because I wrote in
your terms generally and sent it to a prominent personage”, i.e., Pope Benedict XV.8
The day before Stadler sent his “Memorandum” to the Pope, Dr. Pilar wrote a letter
to the Archbishop of Zagreb, Dr. Antun Bauer, asking him to intercede with the Holy
See to keep Italy neutral.9
The Holy See supported the preservation of the Monarchy, because the Habs-
burg State was the largest Catholic state in Europe at the time, and this alone made
it potentially the most reliable ally of the Papal state in the complex international
relations of the early 20th century. Pope Benedict XV threw his considerable diplo-
matic influence behind the attempt to prevent Italy’s entering the war on the side of
the Entente. In fact, he encouraged the Monarchy’s leaders to concede territory to
its insatiable Adriatic neighbour. Negotiations between the two states were termi-
nated the moment the Entente powers, under the terms of the secret London
Treaties of April 26, 1915, guaranteed Italy far greater territorial concessions than the
Monarchy was prepared to make.10 The untrustworthy ally became a bitter enemy
in the battlefield.
Pilar’s “Memorandum” to Archbishop Stadler
(July 1917)
During the last two years of the World War I, Dr. Ivo Pilar made many attempts to
find an optimal solution to the burning “South Slav Question”, that is the Croatian
question, within the confines of the dualistic structure of the Monarchy and thereby
guarantee its survival as a European great power in the Danubian basin and on the
Balkan peninsula. After the death of Emperor and King Francis Joseph I in
December 1916, who had sat on the throne since 1848, Slovene, Serb, Croatian and
Muslim (Bosnian) politicians began directing their politics toward demanding the
greatest degree of independence possible for their lands, which in constitutional
terms were divided between the two halves of the Habsburg state. They based their
claims on “national principles,” that is, “the right to national self-determination” and
“Croatian state right”. These two principles were emphasized by the members of the
Yugoslav Club at the Imperial Council in Vienna, the parliament of the Austrian half
7 Luka –AKOVI∆, PolitiËke organizacije bosanskohercegovaËkih katolika Hrvata. (I. Dio: Do otvaranja Sa-
bora 1910.), Zagreb, 1985, p. 229. and etc.; Jure KRI©TO, “Uloga Ive Pilara u hrvatskom organiziranju u
Bosni i Hercegovini,” in: [SreÊko LIPOV»AN and Zlatko MATIJEVI∆, ed.], Godiπnjak Pilar. Prinosi za pro-
uËavanje æivota i djela dra. Ive Pilara (further: GP), 1/2001, pp. 86-93. 
8 Zoran GRIJAK, “Ivo Pilar i Stadlerova promemorija papi Benediktu XV., g. 1915.”, in: GP, 1/2001, p. 108. 
9 Ibid., pp. 106-107.
10 Milan MARJANOVI∆, Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915. Prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914.-1917.,
Zagreb, 1960.
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of the Monarchy, and in the “May Declaration” (1917).11 The cryptically formulated
“Declaration” could potentially be interpreted in many ways. To some, it was seen
as the work of the Viennese court and an attempt at a “trialistic solution” 12 to the
“South Slav Question” within the Monarchy’s borders; for others, it was a matter of
“necessary political tactics” in the conditions of war, which enabled the promotion
of “Yugoslav ideas” and the “creation of a common state for all Yugoslav peoples,”
besides the Bulgars, outside the Monarchy’s borders.13
Among the first to realize that the “May Declaration” and its proponents had as
their ultimate goal the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the cre-
ation of an independent Yugoslav state, Dr. Pilar handed Archbishop Stadler his
“Memorandum on the Solution of the South Slav Question” (“Denkschrift über die
südsla[w]ische Frage”).14 Analyzing the geo-political situation and relating it to the
“South Slav Question”, Pilar proposed, as the “optimal solution,” the “unification of
the South Slavic regions into one single administrative area” which would include:
Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Istria, Carniola, southern Styria to
the Drava river, Gorica and Gradiπka. For Trieste he envisioned a form of special
status, by which this port would be directly subordinated to state authority.15 In this
“Memorandum”, he showed particular concern for the future of Bosnia and Herce-
govina. In Pilar’s view, Serbian politicians had succeeded in misusing the idea of
“national unity” [narodno jedinstvo] of Serbs and Croats in the interests of their own
expansionist politics: “If the Serbs and Croats are one people then it logically fol-
lows from this that the Serbs, on the basis of national principles, have the right to
strive toward the unification of all South Slav regions into one Great Serbian state.” 16
Further, he believed that the United States of America, with President Wilson at its
head, had accepted the idea that Bosnia and Hercegovina “must be torn” from the
sphere of the Monarchy and on the basis of the nationality principle “turned over”
to Serbia.17 Supposing that the unification of all the South Slavic lands of the Mo-
narchy might lead to insurmountable problems, Pilar proposed a “minimal solution,”
that is, the “unification of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, [and] Bosnia and Hercegovi-
na”.18 This constitutional entity, in his opinion, had “the national, geopolitical, and
economic preconditions for successful development”.19 Without the realization of at
least this “minimal solution” it was impossible, argued Pilar, to find any solution to
11 Ferdo ©I©I∆, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata, i Slovenaca 1914.-1919., Zagreb, 1920, p.
94.
12 M. GROSS, “Hrvatska politika velikoaustrijskog kruga oko prijestolonsljednika Franje Ferdinanda,” »a-
sopis za suvremenu povijest (further: »SP), Zagreb, 2/1970, no. 2, pp. 9-74.
13 Dragovan ©EPI∆, Italija, Saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje 1914-1918, 1970, pp. 204-205.
14 University and National Library, Zagreb; Collection of old and rare books and manuscripts; Ostavπtina
Ive Pilara [The papers of Ivo Pilar] (further: OIP), R-5708.
15 Ibid., p. 7.
16 Ibid., p. 6.
17 Ibid., p. 7.
18 Ibid., p. 8.
19 Ibid.
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the “South Slav Question,” and this could ultimately have only negative conse-
quences for the future existence of the Monarchy.20
The “Memorandum” of Stadler-Pilar political circle to Emperor Charles
(August 1917)
Concern for the survival of the Monarchy and the future of the Croat people who
had lived within its borders for centuries induced Archbishop Stadler and Dr. Pilar
into concrete political action. For this reason, the “Memorandum on the solution to
the South Slav Question” (“Promemoria über die Lösung der sdsla[w]ischen Frage”)
to Emperor and King Charles I (IV) was composed.21
This “Memorandum”, which usually is called by Stadler’s or Pilar’s name,22 begins
with the assertion that in the period from the promulgation of the Austro-Hungarian
Agreement to the outbreak of the First World War the “South Slav Question” was,
for the Monarchy, the “most pressing aspect of the Eastern Question”, which affect-
ed the internal political life of the state in a “disastrous way.” 23 Assuming that the
Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) would achieve a military victory
over the Entente Powers and their allies, the author of the “Memorandum” did not
believe that this would lead to important changes which would reduce tensions and
enable the establishment of lasting peace in the international relations of the Euro-
pean continent. For this very reason, the moment had certainly arrived in which the
Monarchy, out of “a commitment to itself”, had to deal with the “South Slav Ques-
tion” in order that it “cease to be the Achilles heel of the whole state.” 24 The author
of the “Memorandum” was aware of the fact that the solution to the “South Slav
Question” could not be tied to an “general reconstruction of the Monarchy” and
openly carried out as a “effort at trialism”, because at that time there were many im-
pediments to this.25 Thus, the “South Slav Question” had to be resolved in a way that
left the Dualistic structure of the Monarchy, to the largest extent possible, intact.26
Starting from this position, the author laid out his plan for the solution of the
“South Slav Question” in nine points. The first point suggested: “Croatia, Slavonia,
Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Hercegovina are joined into one unitary administrative
area.” 27 The comment attached to this point stated:
20 Ibid.
21 OIP, R-5704b.
22 In November 1917, the Archbishop of Sarajevo told the Hungarian journalist, Arpad Pasztor, that the
“[‘Memorandum’] was not inconsistent with his interpretation.” (“Razgovor ‘Az Estova’ dopisnika s nadbis-
kupom Stadlerom,” Hrvatska, Zagreb, 1917, no. 1892, p. 1.). In other words, the Archbishop hinted at the
possibility that he might not be the author of the “Memorandum”. It is obvious that the “Memorandum”,
even if it was written in the first person singular, was, more or less, the common product of Stadler’s
political circle, in which Dr. Pilar’s ideas played a very important role.
23 OIP, R-5704b, p. 1.
24 Ibid., p. 2.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 L. v. SÜDLAND [Ivo PILAR], Juænoslavensko pitanje. Prikaz cjelokupnog pitanja, Zagreb, 1943., 398.
This point was further developed in the following manner: “Eventually Istria and Carniola. Because it is
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“With the suggested union a territory would be created of approximately 106.000
km sq. and about 5.5 million inhabitants. Of these, about 3.25 million would be
Croats (Catholics and Muslims), about 1.5 million would be Serbs (Orthodox) and
about 0.5 million would be Germans, Hungarians, Italians, and other Slavs of the
Monarchy. Along with the historico-political and ethnic, natural geographic-transport
and economic-political belonging is given to these lands. It must be emphasized,
that the union of three historico-political entities is also the most important moment
for the preservation of conditions in the south, because in the existing situation the
three individual regions can neither economically nor culturally develop. That is
why the division of the South Slav regions can not even be considered, and it would
be an especially unfortunate resolution if […] Hercegovina was to be attached to
Dalmatia, that is Austria, and Bosnia to Hungary.28 I do not hesitate to state that this
type of solution would become the basis for a new war. […].” 29
In the second point it was specifically emphasized that the “territory mentioned
under point 1 would be inseparably tied with both states of the Monarchy,” that is
Austria and Hungary, as a “common area (like Bosnia and Hercegovina are now).” 30
The explanation to this very important point, in which the creation of a new co
dominion territory within the existing dualist structure is envisioned, stated:
“To the common territory, Austria will hand over Dalmatia and the Istrian islands
and Hungary, Croatia and Slavonia. The natural resistance which will arise because
of this will be overcome most easily by the fact that the primary power of both states
[Austria and Hungary] over the territories that were set apart will continue to be a
co-dominion and because the limitations to its powers will be augmented by its
extension to new territories. […] Common possession will tie the fastenings of the
two states of the Monarchy more tightly.” 31
According to the third point of the “Memorandum”, the common ruler should
appoint “a member of the royal Imperial house the Vojvoda [Duke] of Croatia and
grant to him the historical title: “Dux illustris totius regni Croatiae, Sclavoniae, Dal-
matiae, Ramae et Culmae” and entrust “to his name the administration of the terri-
doubtful that we could [now] get these from Austria I do not portray this as indispensibly necessary to a
resolution of the Croatian question. Every means should be because of vital economic and transportation
reasons [used to] attach the Istrian islands Krk, Cres, and Loπinj. Without these islands it is hard to access
the Croatian Littoral [which is] without economic-transport value!” (Reproduced according to “Iz memo-
randuma dr. I. Pilara”, Hrvatska, 1917, no. 1893, 1.) OIP, R-5704b, pp. 4-5.
28 Concerning Hungarian territorial pretensions in Bosnia and Hercegovina see: Hamdija KAPIDÆI∆,
“Austro-ugarska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini i jugoslovensko pitanje za vrijeme prvog svjetskog rata,”
in: Godiπnjak Istoriskog druπtva Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo, 1958., 9/1957., pp. 17-19, 22, 34, 41-47;
Ferdo HAUPTMAN, “Kombinacije oko dræavnopravnog poloæaja Bosne i Hecegovine,” in: Godiπnjak
Druπtva istoriËara Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo, 1/1960., pp. 87-109; L. –AKOVI∆, “Kombinacije
maarskih politiËkih faktora 1915. godine oko prikljuËenja Bosne i Hercegovine Ugarskoj. (Prilog
prouËavanju istorije Bosne i Hercegovine u prvom svjetskom ratu),” Prilozi Instituta za istoriju, Sarajevo,
15/1979., no. 16, pp. 103-145; L. –AKOVI∆, Poloæaj Bosne i Hercegovine u austrougarskim koncepcija-
ma rjeπenja jugoslavenskog pitanja 1914-1918., Tuzla, 1980, pp. 5-192.
29 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399; OIP, R-5704b, pp. 5-6.
30 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 398; OIP, R-5704b, p. 4.
31 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399; OIP, R-5704b, pp. 6-7.
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tory mentioned under [point] 1, to name a responsible ministry under the presiden-
cy of the ban, in order for this ministry to work out a constitution on the basis of
instructions it will receive, to submit this constitution to the governments of both
states [Austria and Hungary], and that they pass it through Parliament.” 32 In explain-
ing this point, the author made the following remarks:
“Croatian dukedom is an institution of Hungarian state right dating back to the
pre-Turkish period. The origins of this institution go back to the earliest Hungarian
and Croatian history, back before the union of the two states. The power of the
duke in that time stretched across the very lands that it would stretch across today,
which can already be seen from the title (Rama and Culma — today’s Bosnia and
Hercegovina). The Croatian duke then was always named when conditions in the
Hungaro-Croatian state were very difficult, or when important questions had to be
settled in the south. The exalted status of a contemporary Croatian duke would be
a sure guarantee, that the difficulties of the new order would be overcome and that,
further, the development of conditions in the south such as took place before the
[First World] War would be rooted out. The institution of Croatian dukedom would
be sympathetically welcomed in Croatia and in Hungary. In its duties, the rule of a
duke would be identical to that of the Palatine in Hungary”.33
According to the designs of the author of the “Memorandum”, presented in the
fourth point, the new “unified administrative territory” had to be “totally autono-
mous in all affairs”, excepting those which were common to the whole Monarchy
as stipulated in the provisions of the Austro-Hungarian Agreement.34 This autonomy
had to serve above all as “one means, to sustain [the Monarchy] in the south”, and
the envisaged “[united administrative territory] to enable its cultural and economic
development”.35
In the fifth point of the “Memorandum” the anticipated powers of the Hungarian
and Austrian prime ministers over the “unified administrative territories” were laid out:
“The prime ministers of both states of the Monarchy have the right, against un-
constitutional laws brought forward in the common unified administrative territory,
to enter a veto within a period of a month, in case something has been proposed
contrary to the law. This veto is a prevention of the law entering into force. In the
prescriptions of the constitution a means should be foreseen by which these kinds
of conflicts can be resolved.” 36
In the accompanying explanation to this point the author called on the already
existing right of “control” of both halves of the Monarchy over Bosnia and Herce-
govina.37
32 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 398; OIP, R-5704b, p. 4.
33 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 400; OIP, R-5704b, pp. 7-8.
34 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 398; OIP, R-5704b, 4. According to the provisions of the Austro-Hungarian
Compromise the Monarchy had three joint ministries: Army, foreign affairs and finances. (A. J. P. TAY-
LOR, op. cit., pp. 166-167.)
35 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 400; OIP, R-5704b, p. 8.
36 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 398; OIP, R-5704b, p. 4.
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In the sixth point, the likely contribution of the “unified administrative territory”
to the common affairs of Austria and Hungary was laid out: 
“The territory mentioned more specifically under [point] 1 takes part in the delib-
erations about common affairs, eventually by way of sending an equal number of
delegates to each state from its own parliament. The quota, according to which the
common unified administrative territory will pay its share of the expense for com-
mon affairs, should be determined according to § 3. of the law referred to under
[point] 4.38 and in conjunction with the above mentioned points.” 39
In explaining this point, the author specifically emphasized that the means sug-
gested for the “unified administrative territory” to cooperate in the common affairs
of the Monarchy had to be “in conformity with the efforts to establish a new order
in the south, protecting to the greatest extent possible the constitutional relations in
the Monarchy.” 40
As regards the administration of customs and taxes, the seventh point of the
“Memorandum” said the following: “The common area mentioned under [point] 1.
will be accepted in the existing tariff zone of the Monarchy41 according to a special
tariff convention. The collection and administration of taxes will be executed by offi-
cials of the above mentioned unified territory”.42
In the eighth point of the “Memorandum” the author suggested an official name
for the anticipated “unified administrative territory”: “The territory, mentioned under
[point] 1 will have the title: Unified Common Territory of the Kingdom of Croatia,
Slavonia, Dalmatia and Herceg-Bosnia and it will be under the political leadership
of the Croats.” 43 The introduction of this title is justified in the following manner:
“The name is derived from the construction of this territory. Croatian leadership
is imposed out of necessity, in order to grant the South Slavs one possible form of
political and cultural fulfillment. It is impossible to carry out South Slav politics and
deny any possibility of life to the South Slavs. Croats were always loyal to the
Monarchy and dynasty, and in every difficult moment for the Monarchy they were
a strong bulwark for the throne and the state. […] The new order in the south there-
fore can only be implemented in Croatian terms. This new order will be an element
of strength and stability for the Monarchy in the south. […].” 44
37 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 400; OIP, R-5704b, p. 8. The position of Bosnia and Hercegovina as a co
dominion was regulated in 1880. (Ferdo »ULINOVI∆, Dræavnopravna historija jugoslavenskih zemalja
XIX. I XX. vijeka /Hrvatska, Slavonija i Dalmacija, Istra, Srpska Vojvodina, Slovenija, Bosna i Hercegovina
te Dræava SHS/, Zagreb, 1953, p. 310.)
38 He is referring to the Austro-Hungarian Agreement.
39 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 398; OIP, R-5704b, pp. 4-5.
40 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 400; OIP, R-5704b, 8.
41 According to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the tariff treaty between the two halves of the Mo-
narchy had to be renewed every ten years. (A. J. P. TAYLOR, op. cit., 166.) 
42 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 398; OIP, R-5704b, 5.
43 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399; OIP, R-5704b, 5.
44 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 400; OIP, R-5704b, 8-9.
Z. MatijeviÊ: The Political Activities of Dr. Ivo Pilar on the Eve of the Demise...
PILAR - Croatian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities / Year I. (2006), Issue 2(2)78
In the ninth and final point of the “Memorandum”, the author attempted to
address a possible Hungarian complaint as regards their loss of unimpeded access
to the Adriatic Sea: “in order to forestall Hungarian complaints, that the new arrange-
ment removes their access to the sea, the Rijeka ‘corpus separatum’[45] will be sur-
rendered to the Hungarian state in full sovereignty, and a constitutional guarantee
will give them the right to take part in decisions regarding fees and administrative
matters on the Gyekenyes-Rijeka railroad. Other railroads in Croatia and Slavonia
naturally pass under the autonomous administration of the new unified territory.” 46
This point, according to its drafter’s opinion “[had] to help in overcoming the con-
siderable difficulties in Hungary.” 47
The following is stated at the end of the “Memorandum”:
“The solution of the South Slav Question, which I am suggesting, would make
the Monarchy a southern rampart, which would have the same value against its ene-
mies in the south and south east [48] that the Military Frontier against the Turks once
had. Once the Croats are politically satisfied and unhindered in their progress, they
will be a sure bulwark for the Monarchy. The bungling and the foot dragging that
has taken place up until now can no longer be defended. The sooner and the more
fundamentally the Monarchy establishes order in the south, the more surely it can
confront all international entanglements.” 49
According to the suggestions presented in the “Memorandum”, the existing dual-
istic structure of the Monarchy had to, at least formally, remain inviolable to the
greatest extent possible. Yet the creation of a new “unified administrative territory,”
in which, besides Banian Croatia and Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina had to be
joined, and its constitutional arrangement as a common possession of Austria and
Hungary, negated the dualistic system as it existed up to that point in important ele-
ments. In other words, the Stadler-Pilar political circle tried to carry out a reorgani-
zation of the Monarchy on the basis of a “veiled trialism” in the form of a co-domin-
ion.
Dr. Pilar was not entirely in agreement with the final text of the “Memorandum”:
“Even if I do not fully agree with the project, it is at least very close to my own
notions, and I see in it a means to the solution of the problem.” 50 To his mind, some
of its points were “actually lacking”.51 Thus he was very critical of points 3. and 6.
concerning the institution of a “Croatian duke” and of the problem of parliamentary
delegations from the “unified administrative territory” cooperating with both states
of the Monarchy.52 In spite of his stated objections, Dr. Pilar saw in the “Memoran-
45 F. »ULINOVI∆, op. cit., 146-151.
46 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399; OIP, R-5704b, 5.
47 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 400; OIP, R-5704b, p. 9.
48 He has the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Italy in mind.
49 L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 400; OIP, R-5704b, p. 9.




dum” the “road to the solution of the problems” on the south of the Monarchy, and
that in “Croatian terms”: “With one of the fundamental points [of the “Memoran-
dum”] I must register my unconditional agreement, with the eighth point. The new
territory can only stand under the political leadership of the Croats and by its con-
tent it can be none other than a Croatian state. It is entirely clear, what I have in
mind by Croatian state. The autonomy, which came about during an eight hundred
year history of development within the framework of the Monarchy. Only this kind
of solution conforms with the benefits of the Monarchy.” 53
On August 14, 1917, Dr. Pilar and Eng. Josip Vancaπ met with the Austrian Prime
Minister, Ernest von Seidler; two days later, they met Stephan von Burián, the joint
Minister of Finance.54 These discussions preceded their audience with Emperor and
King Charles I (IV), which was granted by the Emperor’s Chancery at the request of
Archbishop Stadler. During the half hour audience, Eng. Vancaπ explained the con-
tents of the “Memorandum” on the reform of the Monarchy to the ruler. Pilar spoke
of his objections to parts of the “Memorandum” to the ruler himself and he used the
opportunity of the audience to present some of his own ideas about how he “con-
ceives of a solution to the South Slav or Croatian question.” 55 Charles was also inter-
ested in Pilar’s constitutional views.56
The Stadler-Pilar “Declaration”
(November 1917)
The President of the Yugoslav Club and one of the signatories to the “May Decla-
ration”, Rev. Anton Koroπec traveled to Sarajevo 31 August 1917.57 His intention was
to acquaint himself with the current attitudes of key politicians and religious lead-
ers in Bosnia and Hercegovina. What interested Koroπec the most was the opinion
of Archbishop Stadler and his group to the political program of the “May Decla-
ration”. Dr. Pilar explained the views of the Archbishop of Sarajevo and his adher-
ents to the Slovene politician, repeating what had already been said in the “Memo-
randum on the Resolution of the South Slav Question”.58 In other words, this sup-
port of this political group for the “May Declaration” could not be expected.
Koroπec redeemed his failure in discussions with Stadler’s group by scoring a
success with the Bosnian and Hercegovinian Franciscans, who, in the following
months, gave their unreserved support for the “May Declaration”.59 Before the Fran-
53 Ibid.
54 “Vancaπ i Pilar u audijenciji.”, Hrvatska rijeË (further: HR), Zagreb, 1917, no. 217, p. 2.
55 “Razgovor s J. pl. Vancaπem,” Novine, Zagreb, 4/1917, no. 200, pp. 3-4.
56 “Deputacija pl. Vancaπa i dra. Pilara.”, Novine, 4/1917, no. 192, p. 4. On this occasion Dr. Pilar gave
his own “Memorandum” to the Emperor. (Ibid.) On the possible content of this “Memorandum” see: Z.
GRIJAK, “O sadræaju promemorije Ive Pilara caru Karlu I. (IV.) iz kolovoza 1917. godine,” in: GP, 2/2002,
pp. 83-102.
57 MomËilo ZE»EVI∆, Slovenska ljudska stranka i jugoslovensko ujedinjenje 1917-1921. Od Majske dekla-
racije do vidovdanskog ustava, Beograd, 1973, pp. 92-94.
58 L. –AKOVI∆, Poloæaj Bosne i Hercegovine, pp. 176-177.
59 B.[onifac] BADROV, “Odjek svibanjske deklaracije u Bosni.”, FranjevaËki Vijesnik, Visoko — Sarajevo,
35/1928, no. 12, pp. 363-365. For the statement of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian in favor of the “May
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ciscans publicly endorsed the “May Declaration”, the “Declaration of Clerical Groups
of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian Catholics” (or Stadler’s “Declaration”) was issued
in November 1917, which in its content was totally contrary to the “Declaration” of
the Yugoslav Club.
The second point in the “Declaration” demanded the following:
“We ask for the unification of those lands to which Croatian state right extends,
namely Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina and Croatian Istria, into
one politically and financially autonomous state entity to be tied irrevocably to the
entirety of the Habsburg Monarchy.” 60
The “Declaration” was signed by Archbishop Stadler, not only in his own name
but “in the name of 51 outstanding citizens of Sarajevo and the Province”, whose
signatures were not published.61 To the “Declaration” was added an unsigned
accompanying article entitled “To the Defense of Croatism!”, in which the program
of the “May Declaration” was argumentatively rejected as politically unrealistic, call-
ing for the kind of solutions which were based on the demands presented in Stad-
ler’s “Declaration”, that is to say, demands based exclusively on Croatian State Right
directed against the then current Hungarian pretensions to Bosnia and Hercegovi-
na.62
Stadler’s “Declaration” immediately called forth divided reactions: adherents of
the “May Declaration” attacked it, among which, prominently, were members of the
Croatian Catholic Seniorate,63 the elite clerical-lay organizations of the Croatian
Catholic movemen,64 while some Catholic priests, the Party of (Croat State) Right
(Frankists), and RadiÊ’s Croat People’s Peasant Party supported it.65
Nobody of the political figures of the time believed that Archbishop Stadler was
the initiator and author of the “Declaration”. Suspicion as to its authorship fell pri-
marily on General Baron Stjepan SarkotiÊ,66 who was believed to have, through the
intercession of Dr. Pilar and Dr. Ivica PaviËiÊ, influenced Archbishop Stadler to pub-
lish and sign the “Declaration”.67 Yet the style of the “Declaration” and the accom-
panying article point to their author being Dr. Pilar’s work, a fact that he confirmed
ten years later.68
Declaration” see: F. ©I©I∆, op. cit., pp. 107-108.
60 “Izjava,” Hrvatski dnevnik (further: HD), Sarajevo, 12/1917, no. 263, p. 1.
61 Ibid.
62 “Na obranu Hrvatstva!”, HD, 12/1917, 263, p. 1.
63 Z. MATIJEVI∆, “Hrvatski katoliËki seniorat i politika (1912.-1919.),” Croatica Christiana Periodica, Za-
greb, 24/2000, no. 46, pp. 121-162. 
64 Jure KRI©TO, PreπuÊena povijest. KatoliËka crkva u hrvatskoj politici (1850.-1918.) Zagreb, 1994.
65 Z. MATIJEVI∆, “Izjava vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa dr. Josip Stadlera iz studenoga 1917. godine,” »SP,
31/1999, no. 1, pp. 51-72.
66 Ernest BAUER, Der letzte Paladin des Reiches. Generaloberst Stefan Freiherr SarkotÊ von LovÊen, Graz
— Wien — Köln, 1988.
67 Marijo MATULI∆, “Postanak Jugoslavije,” in: SeljaËki Kalendar, Zagreb, for 1928, pp. 44-45.
68 Boæidar JAN»IKOVI∆, “Ivo Pilar u svjetlu nepoznatih dokumenata,” in: GP, 1/2002, p. 242.
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Pilar’s “Memorandum” to Count Tisza
(September 1918)
At the beginning of 1918, the situation on the European battlefields appeared more
than favourable for the Central Powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Turkey. Indeed, on February 9, 1918 the Central Powers reached a peace with the
newly established independent Ukrainian state. Three weeks later, on March 3,
1918, in Brest-Litovsk, they signed an advantageous peace treaty with the new Soviet
(Bolshevik) government in Russia. Then Rumania, two months later on May 7, 1918,
succumb to combined German-Austrian military pressure and was forced to sign a
separate peace. Some weeks earlier, the German General Staff, carried away by
these successes, had launched the great spring offensive on the western front on
March 21, 1918. Success was not absent. The Allied line began to give way in the
face of massive German assaults. The German army approached to within 70 km of
Paris. The Central Powers were almost certain of final victory.69 But the unexpected
Allied counter-offensives under the command of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, halted the
German advance. The fortunes of war passed to the Entente powers. Even if the col-
lapse of the Central Powers seemed ever clearer, the members of the Entente were
still not in agreement as to the question of who was — “enemy number one”. For
the Kingdom of Italy, without doubt, this was the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. To
the other Allies — France, Great Britain, and the United States of America — this
was Germany. None of these states had assumed in its war aims the total destruc-
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and its disappearance from the map of
Europe. Even Italy was only interested in reducing its territory. This meant that the
leading political circles in the Entente countries “approached conservatively and hes-
itantly all hypotheses and plans concerning the eventual division of Austria-Hungary
and, consequently, the creation of a common Yugoslav state made up of some of
its regions and the lands beyond its framework and the ruins of its framework.” 70
Even the Serbian government, which was still in exile on Corfu, had two solutions
regarding the possible fates of the Monarchy — a “big” one and a “small” one. The
“big” solution envisioned the separation — according to “ethnographic principles”
— of territories from the Monarchy where “South Slav peoples” (Slovenes, Croats,
and Serbs) lived, and their union with the Kingdom of Serbia, after it restoration to
its prewar borders. The “little” solution was limited to the creation of a “Great Ser-
bia,” that is, the kind of Serbia that in its borders would include all those parts of
the Monarchy where Serbs, allegedly, had a “marked” or “predominant majority”.71
Despite a relatively good diplomatic and military outlook, the Dual Monarchy’s
internal crisis grew more serious with each passing day, primarily because of the dis-
satisfaction of its many Slavic peoples (Poles, Czechs, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, etc.),
69 Bogdan KRIZMAN, “Stvaranje jugoslavenske dræave. (Referat na Drugom kongresu historiËara Jugosla-
vije),” Historijski pregled (further: HP), Zagreb, 4/1958, no. 3-4, pp. 167-168.
70 B. KRIZMAN, “Austrougarska diplomacija u danima raspadanja Dvojne Monarhije 1918. god.,” HP,
8/1962, no. 1, p. 15.
71 B. KRIZMAN, “Stvaranje jugoslavenske dræave. (Referat),” p. 170.
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but also because of disagreements between Austria’s two dominant nations, the
Germans and the Hungarians. The crisis was most severe in the Monarchy’s south.
Emperor and King Charles perceived the importance of the “South Slav
Question” to the Monarchy’s future rather early on. Attempting to save his state, the
Emperor decided to entrust an important political “informative mission” to the for-
mer Hungarian prime minister István Tisza, still considered to be the most influen-
tial politician in Hungary. Calling Tisza from the southwestern front, Charles held an
audience with him on September 7, 1918 where he gave him the task of travelling
to the “South Slav lands” of the Monarchy in the capacity of a “homo regius” in order
to try to find a life-saving formula to avert the danger threatening the Habsburg
state.72
Tisza’s first stop in his political tour of the south of the Monarchy was Zagreb,
where he arrived on September 13, 1918.73 Some days later, on September 13, 1918,
general SarkotiÊ received a telegram from Tisza in which he asked SarkotiÊ “to meet
him in Sarajevo on September 20”.74 In SarkotiÊ’s opinion, Tisza’s journey was “inap-
propriate,” but he met the Hungarian Count any way.75
In Sarajevo, Tisza met with many mainly Yugoslav oriented Bosnian and Herce-
govinian politicians from all three “ethnic-religious” communities (Croat-Catholic,
Serb-Orthodox, and Bosnian-Muslim),76 among which were included on the recom-
mendation of provincial chief SarkotiÊ, the anti-Yugoslav oriented Dr. Pilar and Eng.
Vancaπ.77
On September 22, 1918, Tisza met with Dr. Pilar for the second time.78 On this
occasion he handed the Hungarian politician the “Memorandum” (“Denkschrift”),79
wherein he wanted to justify the “pro-Austrian orientation” 80 of his political circle in
72 B. KRIZMAN, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 251. Before Tisza’s mission to the Monarchy’s south,
Hungarian politicians had envisioned a few possible solutions to the “South Slav Question”. The three
following were mentioned most often: “a) Bosnia and Hercegovina are united with Hungary as ‘separa-
tum corpus sacrae coronae hungariae’. b) Dalmatia is attached to Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina to
Hungary. c) Croatia receives from Bosnia its western districts: BihaÊ and Banja Luka, and from Dalmatia
the portion north of Split. The southern portion of Dalmatia with Dubrovnik and Boka Kotarska, Herce-
govina, and the eastern part of Bosnia along with the Bosanski Brod-Sarajevo-Mostar-Zelenika railway as
an axis would fall to Hungary.” (H. KAPIDÆI∆, “Austro-ugarska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini,” p. 43.)
73 B. KRIZMAN, “O putu grofa Stj. Tisze po jugoslavenskim zemljama u septembru 1918,” Historijski
zbornik, Zagreb, 11-12/1958-59, pp. 233-249; B. KRIZMAN, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu, pp. 251-
261; L. –AKOVI∆, Poloæaj Bosne i Hercegovine, 178-192; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog
nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, pp. 550-555. See also: Sandor TONELLI, Tisza István utolsoutja (SarkotiÊ István
baro vezerezredes, Bosznia-Hercegovina utolso tartomanyi fönökenek naploja), Szegedin, 1941.
74 B. KRIZMAN, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 252.
75 Ibid.
76 For more about Tisza’s conversations with Serb, Croat, and Muslim (Bosniak) politicians in Sarajevo
see: H. KAPIDÆI∆, “Austro-Ugarska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini,” pp. 44-47; B. KRIZMAN, Hrvatska u
Prvom svjetskom ratu, pp. 254-261; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera,
pp. 550-555. F. ©I©I∆, op. cit., pp. 161-165.
77 B. KRIZMAN, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 252, note 34.
78 Ibid., p. 259.
79 OIP, R-5710.
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their attempt to bring about the constitutional unification of all Croatian lands which
to him included Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Istria.81
Pilar began the “Memorandum” with a general introduction in which he said that he
began his studies of the “South Slav Question” twelve years before,82 when he
learned “[...] what a catastrophic turn of events had occurred in the South” of the
Monarchy.83 To his mind, in “Hungary there is no more consciousness that the
Croatian lands were, and that they always will remain, the most threatened point in
the whole Monarchy”.84 He made this claim on the basis of the geopolitical position
of the Croatian lands: “The geopolitical position of these lands is conditioned by the
fact that every leading power on the Apennine and Balkan peninsulas always aspires
to possess them. They have to aspire to this out of rightful geopolitical reasons, and
thus they must always lean to creating an alliance against anyone who rules Cro-
atia.” 85 In terms of the actual world conflict, Pilar was of the opinion that “the Mo-
narchy has completely unnecessarily secured for itself in the south a reason for
world war, because in 1867 it established a constitutional position which guaranteed
that the state, in order to maintain this order created in opposition to the vital inter-
ests of the Croats, had to rely especially on the Serbs and Italians against the Croats.
This politics was carried out successfully until a cause for a world war appeared and
now it is clear that Serbs and Italians are united to seize these [Croatian] lands from
our Monarchy.” 86
In the discussion that followed in the “Memorandum”, Pilar presented his view
of the relations between Magyars and Croats during their 800 year coexistence in a
common state.87 In his opinion this common state survived for so long because the
Hungarians did not hinder the existence of Croatian statehood.88 Problems between
the two peoples began, he feels, only in the 19th century when “the idea of a uni-
tary Magyar state” arose and replaced the historical notion of Hungary that had exist-
ed until that time.89
80 In the “Memorandum”, Pilar stated: “The Hungarians stand before the choice of defending the long
Carpathian front or the long Adriatic front. They will always choose the Carpathian front, and we will
stay with those who will settle with the Italians. In this Austria can help us more […]. Our affection for
Austria is the emotional expression of this understanding, though it has faded many times over.” (OIP,
R-5710, [p. 3].; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosasnkog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 553.)
81 OIP, R-5710, 1; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosasnkog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera,552. In terms of his
understanding of the extent of Croatian lands, Pilar referred Tisza to his book Die südlawische Frage und
der Weltkrieg (Vienna, 1918) and to his second chapter in particular, pp. 140-232. (OIP, R-5710, p. 1; Z.
GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosankog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 724, note 2541.)
82 OIP, R-5710, p. 1. In other words, his interest in the “South Slav Question” began around 1906.
83 Ibid; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 552.
84 Ibid.
85 OIP, R-5710, pp. 1-2; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 252.
86 OIP, R-5710, p. 2; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 552.
87 OIP, R-5710, [pp. 3-4]; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 553.
88 “We Croats could live well with the Magyars for 800 years, because they allowed our statehood to con-
tinue to live.” (OIP, R-5710, [p. 4]; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera,
p. 553.)
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In his dissection of Croatian-Hungarian relations, Pilar expressed great wonder
at Hungarian sympathy for the Serbs.90 To him these sympathies were proof that
Hungarians understood “neither the aims nor the nature of the Serbs”.91 Because
according to him, “Serbian aims are the weakening and ultimate assimilation of the
Bulgars and Croats, and the unification of the whole Slavic Balkans into a Great Ser-
bia. The basis for this is their middle position between the Bulgars and Croats, their
state-political and church-political tradition […], and the circumstance that they were
the first South Slavs who were able to renew their state after the collapse of the
Ottomans.” 92
Without mincing words Pilar accused the Hungarians, by helping the Serbs, of
contributing to the fact that “they have become so strong in the south, that they can
contest the Monarchy’s possession of the South Slav lands.” 93 Then followed this
direct accusation: “[…] 50 years of struggle for the idea of a unitary Hungarian state
has shown as its only result, that now in the south the Serbian state idea is on the
best path to victory.” 94
Pilar did not doubt that the main role in bringing about the idea of a Greater
Serbia state was allotted to the Serbian Orthodox Church: “The Serbian Orthodox
national church is the instrument: it is more of a social-political warring and initiat-
ing organization than a religious community, and its power has not been sufficient-
ly perceived for long.” 95
Warning Tisza of the complete disastrousness of the current politics toward Cro-
atian aspirations, Pilar says: “The state is now in the position that it can not effec-
tively confront the dangerous centrifugal forces in the south, namely Greater Serbia
irredentism, which has been quietly at work since 1860, yet it has to support its nat-
ural enemies [Serbs] against its loyal elements [Croats]. This disastrous politics was
carried out for so long that loyal Croats realized that loyalty is not at all helpful, that
it in fact becomes disloyalty, and that disloyalty always is more effective.” 96
Pilar warned Tisza that the state of affairs in the Monarchy’s south was such that
“the Monarchy was going to lose the South Slav lands forever, if not in this war, then
certainly in the next.” 97
The unclear constitutional position of the Croatian lands led, according to Pilar,
to the fact that Croats “today in large part prepared to accept as a substitute [for a
89 “Our relations were irreparably poisoned only with the idea of a unitary Hungarian [Magyar] state,
which which thus had to include and consume Croatia. I believe that Louis Kossuth gave this idea its
sharpest outline, because he wanted to end Croatian autonomy, divide up Croatia, and Magyarize the
Croats.” (OIP, R-5710, [p. 4]; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 553.)
90 Ibid.
91 OIP, R-5710, [p. 5]; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 553.
92 OIP, R-5710, [p. 5].
93 OIP, R-5710, [p. 4].
94 Ibid.; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 553.
95 OIP, R-5710, [p. 5]; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 553.
96 OIP, R-5710, [p. 6].
97 Ibid; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 553.
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Croatian state within the Monarchy], a Serbo-Croatian state outside of the Monarchy,
and this is the fundamental idea of Yugoslavism.” 98
But that which Pilar knew the Magyars did not know: “Unfortunately in Hungary
the current extent of the danger to the position in the south is still unknown.
Likewise, it is not known that the moment of decision is here: either a Kingdom of
Croatia as a crown land within the Monarchy or a soon to be Kingdom of Great
Serbia outside the Monarchy.” 99
For Pilar, only one solution to the difficult situation in which the Monarchy
found itself existed: “We have come so far, that today only the speedy unification
of Bosnia and Hercegovina with the remaining Croatian lands can help, and the
implementation of one Croatian [political] direction. The attempt to lead politics as
they have been led up to now, can only have as a consequence the worsening of
the position of the state in the south. But, the situation is so ‘tense’ that it could bear
no worsening.” 100
Finally, Pilar suggested the following in the “Memorandum”: “1. Croatia, Slavo-
nia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and the Istrian islands will be united in a Croatian Kingdom;
2. The Croatian Kingdom must politically be in the hands of Croats and a Croatian
program must be put in place in an acceptable way; 3. The Croatian Kingdom will
be included in the dualistic organization in the form of sub-dualism and it will enjoy
partial sovereignty within the framework of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen,
subject to (a) a guarantee to Croatia of unconditional national and state individual-
ity and the extension to the new territory of the possibility of unhindered develop-
ment in economy and transportation, and (b) Austria’s acceptance of this solu-
tion.” 101
Pilar’s “Memorandum” was yet another attempt to re-organize the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy on the principle of “veiled trialism,” that is, to nominally leave the
dualistic structure of the state in place yet implement the constitutional unification
of all Croatian lands, including Bosnia and Hercegovina. This proposal was opposed
to the Hungarian intention of strengthening the dualistic system, a plan which in
part called for trying to join Bosnia and Hercegovina directly to Hungary, as a “cor-
pus separatum”.102
Pilar’s views on the reform of the Monarchy, as might be expected, did not
receive Tisza’s approval.
The day after Tisza’s departure, September 24, 1918, the new joint Minister of
Finance, Alexander Spitzmüller von Harmersbach, arrived in Sarajevo.103 On the
occasion of his departure, on September 27, 1918, from Sarajevo to Vienna, he ran
across Dr. Pilar at the railway station. According to the newspaper reports, the min-
98 OIP, R-5710, [p. 4]; Z. GRIJAK, PolitiËka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, pp. 553-554.
99 OIP, R-5710, [p. 6].
100 Ibid.
101 B. KRIZMAN, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 259-260.
102 Z. GRIJAK, Politiπka djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 554.
103 Ibid, 555; Alexander SPITZMÜLLER, “…und hat auch Ursach, es zu lieben.”, Vienna - Munich - Stuttgart
- Zürich, 1955, pp. 252-256.
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ister invited him to “come to Vienna, to present his position on the solution to the
Bosnian question that is, the whole South Slav problem.” 104
In the somber atmosphere of the last weeks of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’s
existence, Dr. Pilar arrived in Vienna, where he gave two lectures to “Austrian polit-
ical society”.105 Right at the start of his second lecture, aimed at the Austrian-German
political public, he argued that the “urgency of the South Slav Question” stemmed
from the fact that the war, which was “sparked by this question”, was threatening
“the Monarchy with an unpleasant end”.106 In Pilar’s view, the Austro-Hungarian
compromise was one of the main reasons for the difficult situation in the Monarchy’s
south. Under its provisions Dalmatia, which indisputably belonged to Croatia, was
reduced to a legal position which was “unique in the world”:
“[…] according to the December Constitution (21. XII. 1867) Dalmatia fell to
Austria, but according to the earlier Compromise — to Hungary. This gave rise to
that unfortunate, uncertain position in which Dalmatia, according to Austrian state
right as well as de facto, belonged to Austria, and according to Hungarian state right
as well as virtually — Hungary.” 107
Bosnia and Hercegovina were no less of a problem. Relations in that part of the
state had become unbearable, in Pilar’s opinion, as a result of the political efforts of
Gyula Andrassy, the first Hungarian Prime Minister in the Dual Monarchy:
“He occupied Bosnia and Hercegovina in order to forestall the creation of a
Greater Serbia Empire. Unfortunately, he had partly insufficient and partly incorrect
information regarding the essence and strength of the Greater Serbia idea. Thus he
wanted to break the Greater Serbia movement in Bosnia, but he did not allow, com-
ing from a Hungarian perspective, the other possible solution — Croatian. He want-
ed, therefore, to create a national-political vacuum in Bosnia. This was a regime that
from its very beginning was doomed to fail, and the result is now apparent in that
the Greater Serbia idea is about to be realized at the Monarchy’s expense. This result
will be realized because Andrássy organized Bosnia in such a way that Magyar influ-
ence would gradually be predominant; Bosnia was, hence, treated as if it were a
Magyar area of interest. […] Together with Magyar influence Magyar serbophilism,
which is the enemy of Croats, took hold, and soon the final result of this will
become apparent.” 108
Owing to what he said above, and also some other errors, the entirety of the
Monarchy’s politics, to Pilar’s way of thinking, had “wound up on the wrong
track”.109 “Most ominous,” of the whole constitutional and political quagmire in the
Monarchy’s south, was the fact that “the South Slav Question in its current balance
104 “Raspoloæenje u Bosni,” Novine, 5/1918, no. 214, p. 3.
105 The first lecture was held on 9 and the second on 12 October 1918. The outline of the second lecture,
which began with the words “Meine Herren!”, has been preserved. (OIP, R-5712, p. 1).
106 Ibid, pp. 1-2.
107 OIP, R-5172, p. 6.
108 Ibid, pp. 8-9.
109 Ibid, p. 9.
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of relations between right and might, can no longer be solved at all in a legal
way.” 110 Despite this gloomy statement Pilar offered the following solution:
“The South Slav Question has to be solved. […] The solution can only be imple-
mented within a general reconstruction of the Monarchy. The reconstruction of the
Monarchy can only be successful and purposeful if it takes into account its nature.
The Monarchy, in its historical development, is a conglomerate, a sanctuary for the
remains of various states and peoples, who because of the violent assaults of the
waves of history here in the transition zone between East and West were ship-
wrecked, finding shelter in the framework of the Monarchy. The Monarchy can ful-
fill its life’s purpose only if it continues to provide, to those states and peoples who
are still alive, a sure sanctuary. Regrettably, the aged Monarchy has let this task go
undone and thus must, in its contemporary [dualistic] form, experience collapse. […]
Let us not delude ourselves! The Monarchy in its old form — is dead. […] I believe
[…] that the reconstruction [of the Monarchy] can only take place on a federalistic
foundation. The existing Monarchy can now only be a federal state composed of
several small national states. A single federative South Slav state will enter into the
framework of this federative state.” 111
In Pilar’s opinion, the “South Slav federal state” could be built in one of two
ways: 1. if the Croatian and Slovenian lands of the Monarchy were made into “two
small federal states — Croatia and Slovenia”; and 2., if all the South Slav lands of
the Monarchy were made into “a unified South Slav state [‘Südslavien’]”.112 Pilar him-
self assumed that the second solution would be “real”, because “the first [Croatian]
state would not be acceptable to neither the Entente nor the people in the south of
the [Monarchy].”113
Pilar concluded his lecture with words which in themselves carried the portent
of numerous tragic historical events for the Central European region in the last cen-
tury of the second millennium of the Christian era: “All peoples need the Monarchy
on its present territory, and if they forget about it at this moment in time, they will
soon learn to value it in the harsh school of life.” 114
Radicalizing his views about the possible solution of not only the “South Slav
Question”, which was for him basically identical to the solution of the situation of
the Croatian lands, but also for the survival of the whole Monarchy, Pilar gave up
on “veiled Trialism” and openly took up the cause of federalization of the Habsburg
state. The reform of the Dual Monarchy into a federal state would, in his opinion,
solve all the constitutional problems of Croatia and the Austrian and Hungarian
halves of the state. However, the efforts of Dr. Pilar and those people who shared
his political views, to reform the internal political organization of the Monarchy in
its final moments and save it from its inescapable collapse, but to also ensure Croatia
110 Ibid, p. 10.
111 Ibid, pp. 10-14.
112 Ibid, p. 13.
113 Ibid, pp. 13-14.
114 Ibid, p. 16.
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a constitutional position in the Central European culture sphere, did not obtain the
expected result. Even before the formal end of the First World War, the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy disappeared from the political map of Central Europe, relinquish-
ing its place to the new states which emerged from its ruins. “The South Slav
Question” was “solved” outside the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,
and the Croatian lands, together with Bosnia and Hercegovina, found themselves in
the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the Serbian
KaraoreviÊ dynasty.
Summary
On several occasions during World War I Dr. Ivo Pilar endeavoured to find
the optimal solution to the burning “Southern Slavic” or Croatian question
within the borders of the dualistically constituted Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy. Setting forth from the then current fact that the solution to the
“Southern Slavic question” could be tied neither to the general reconstruc-
tion of the Monarchy nor to the realisation of the triadic formula of its
reconstitution, he ardently advocated its remodelling on the basis of a “con-
cealed triadism” in the form of condominial relations between Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand, and the Austrian and Hungarian
parties of the state on the other. In the dismal atmosphere of the last weeks
of the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Pilar arrived in Vienna
to hold two lectures. According to him, the Austro-Hungarian agreement
was one of the main causes of the grave state of affairs in the south of the
Monarchy. Having radicalised his stands on not only the possible solution
to the “Southern Slavic question” but also the survival of the Monarchy as a
whole, he renounced the idea of “concealed triadism” and started openly
advocating the idea of a federation of the Habsburg state. However, even
before the war formally ended, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy vanished
from the political map of Central Europe, surrendering its position to the
new countries constituted on its ruins. The “Southern Slavic question” was
“solved” outside the Central European political, economic and cultural cir-
cle, while the Croatian states, together with Bosnia and Herzegovina,
became part of a newly constituted Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,
having thus entered the Balkan geopolitical region.
